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Abstract
We analyze a principal-supervisor-two-agent hierarchywith inefficient supervision. The su-
pervisor may collects a wrong signal on each agent’s unobservable effort level. When reporting
to the principal, the supervisor can collude with one or both agents to manipulate the signal
in exchange for a bribe. In contract design, we identify a new trade-off between the loss from
supervisor-agent collusion and the risk from inefficient supervision: Although allowing collu-
sion makes shirking more attractive to the agents, it brings in a benefit because it can “correct”
an incorrect negative signal when the agent has exerted effort. Such collusive supervision saves
risk premiums that the principal has to pay for incentive provision. We characterize the princi-
pal’s optimal contract choice among no-supervision, collusion-proof, and collusive-supervision
contracts. We show that the collusive-supervision contract dominates when the supervisory ef-
ficiency is at an intermediate level.
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1 Introduction
In many organizations, agents are rewarded based on both objective performance indicators
and subjective evaluations made by their supervisors. For example, most private companies es-
tablish some key performance indicators (KPI)1 to evaluate employees such as the amount of sales
and project completion progress, but at the same time the employees also have their performance
subjectively assessed by intermediate supervisors. In the public sector, the promotion of low-level
government officials usually depends not only on their performance on assigned tasks but also the
opinions of higher-ups. In such cases, supervisory efficiency – whether the supervisor can accu-
rately and correctly assess performance – plays an important role in agents’ incentive provisions.
To explore this importance, we examine the presence of supervisory efficiency in a multiple-
agent environment, where themultiple agentswork as a team to complete a task. A typical example
is that a manager of a pharmaceutical company hires a research team that consists of multiple re-
searchers (agents). The manager cannot observe each researcher’s contribution but can observe
whether the development of a new drug is successful. Part of the teamworking hard may be suffi-
cient to achieve the goal; thus, a moral hazard problem arises: Some researchers may free ride on
others. To provide proper incentive, an intermediate supervisor is sent to assess the agents’ per-
formances and obtains signals about the contribution of each teammate. Having this supervisor
can be valuable in preventing free riding and incentivizing the whole team.2 On the other hand,
having the supervisor may lead to two problems: First, the supervisor may make mistakes in re-
viewing the performance of these researchers; second, the supervisor may collude with (some or
all of) the researchers and always report that “everybody works hard,” which, in turn, mitigates
the effectiveness of the supervision. In this case, is the supervisory information still useful? Should
collusion be allowed or completely prevented? Will the supervisor collude with one agent only or
both agents? More generally, how should the principal design the optimal contract?
With these research questions, we study the contracting problem in a multiple-agent hierarchy
with both the possibility of inefficient supervision and collusion. Specifically, we consider a three-
level hierarchy with a principal, a supervisor (she), and two productive agents (he/they). With
some probability, the supervisory technology can be either efficient or inefficient: The former can
always observe an accurate signal of the agents’ effort levels, but the latter may collect a wrong
signal. The principal initiates a contract with the supervisor and the two agents for a production
task. Each agent can choose to either work or shirk. After the output is realized, the supervisor
1See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Performance_indicator.
2In such cases, it may be difficult for agents to conduct cross-checking (Baliga, 1999) because each agent is involved
in only some components of the task and thus lacks sufficient knowledge and information to evaluate the performances
of others.
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is sent to collect a signal about the effort level of each agent and to report to the principal. Before
reporting the signal, the supervisor may collude with one or both agents to forge a signal that
favors them; formally, the information is soft for the supervisor-agent coalition (Khalil et al., 2010).
Contingent on the realized output level and the supervisory report, the principal pays transfers to
the agents and the supervisor according to the contract.
We first establish the collusion-proof contract (Tirole, 1986) as a benchmark, where the super-
visor and the agent(s) have no incentive to form any coalition under the payment structure. We
show that when the supervisory efficiency, i.e., the accuracy of the signals, is sufficiently high, the
collusion-proof contract dominates the no-supervisor contract, indicating that the supervisor is
useful to the principal. After establishing the usefulness of inefficient supervision in the hierarchy,
we explore the role of collusion between the supervisor and the agents.
We show that there exists a novel trade-off between the loss from supervisor-agent collusion
and the risk due to inefficient supervision. Because the supervisory technology is imperfect, an
incorrect signal may be observed. If the principal adopts the collusion-proof contract that induces
the supervisor to tell the truth, an agent may bemistakenly punishedwhen heworks but the signal
is wrong. Therefore, the principal must pay risk premiums to the agents as compensation if the
payments depend on the inaccurate signal. As a result, inefficient supervision increases the cost of
preventing collusion. Technically speaking, the interaction between inefficiency supervision and
collusion drives the interlink between the coalition incentive compatibility (CIC) constraints and
the individual incentive compatibility (IC) constraint; satisfying the CIC constraints raises the cost
of satisfying the IC constraint.
With this insight mentioned above, we show that tolerating supervisor-agent collusion makes
the principal better off under certain conditions because collusion helps the principal “correct”
wrong supervisory signals: If an agent exerts high effort but the supervisory signal is negative,
then a collusive supervisor will manipulate the report that reflects the true effort level. As a result,
such collusive supervision lowers the cost of providing an incentive to agents. However, one should
also take into account the downside of allowing collusion: When collusion is allowed, an agent can
free ride on the other agent and bribe the supervisor to forge a positive report for him. The op-
timal collusive-supervision contract balances the gain and loss from allowing collusion based on
the trade-off described above. In the collusive-supervision contract, the principal should prevent
the full-coalition, which involves the supervisor and both agents, but allow the sub-coalition with
one agent only. We then characterize the optimal contract design given various levels of supervi-
sory efficiency. When supervisory efficiency is at an intermediate level, the collusive-supervision
contract dominates both the collusion-proof and the no-supervisor contracts. This new finding
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provides an explanation for why some managers do not rely solely on objective performance indi-
cators to reward workers but also consider subjective evaluations made by intermediate supervi-
sors (MacLeod, 2003).
This paper is closely related to the vast literature on supervision and collusion in organizations
and the design of optimal contracts. The seminal works by Tirole (1986, 1992) examine the role
of corruptible supervision and the issues of incentive provision in a three-tier hierarchy. In the
hierarchy, the supervisor can colludewith the agent based on a side contract and conceal a negative
signal or make a favorable report.3 Tirole’s central findings include that information from the
corruptible supervisor remains useful for the principal and, moreover, that the optimal contract
implemented by the principal is collusion-proof.4 Tirole (1986) also argues that as supervisory
information becomes less verifiable, the supervisor is less useful. Thus, when information is soft,
i.e., entirely unverifiable, supervision becomes completely useless in the hierarchy. Kessler (2000)
shows that if the supervisor’s signal is verifiable, the possibility of collusion does not impose any
additional cost to the principal.
In a single-agent hierarchywith soft supervisory information, Kofman andLawarrée (1996) and
Khalil et al. (2010) find that it may be optimal to allow collusion. In Kofman and Lawarrée (1996),
the supervisor (auditor) can be either honest or dishonest, so the principal must adopt a high-
powered incentive scheme to induce truth-telling. Allowing collusion is less expensive when the
proportion of honest supervisors is large. In contrast, we focus on dishonest supervision only. In
Section 6.3, we characterize the contract when the supervisor is honest but possibly inefficient and
show that the collusive-supervision contract would also dominate the honest-supervision contract
under certain conditions.
Khalil et al. (2010) consider the case in which the supervisor uses the ability to conceal positive
signal to extort the agent. They show that both bribery (supervisor-agent collusion) and extortion
weaken the incentive scheme, but the latter is more severe; thus, the principal benefits by allowing
collusion to attenuate the room for extortion. We also reach the result that collusion becomes “use-
ful” in lowering the principal’s total cost in the contract. However, the basic trade-off in our model
is different; the imperfect supervisory technology drives the usefulness of collusion in correcting
supervisory signals in a multiple-agent environment. In Section 6.2, we show that such a trade-off
3This modeling framework opens up an important strand of literature on collusion in hierarchical agency. See, for
example, Laffont and Tirole (1991); Kofman and Lawarrée (1993); Mookherjee and Png (1995); Strausz (1997); Lambert-
Mogiliansky (1998); Khalil et al. (2013, 2015); Burlando and Motta (2015).
4The principal can prevent collusion by rewarding the supervisor with a payment equivalent to the agent’s wage
when she reports negative information about the agent’s effort. In some environments, the principal may be better off
allowing a certain scope for collusion between the supervisor and the agent when information is hard. See, for example,
Che (1995); Olsen and Torsvik (1998).
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does not exist in the setting with one agent only.
All the previous studiesmentioned above consider collusion in a three-tier hierarchywith a sin-
gle productive agent. Studies on contract design in multiple-agent organizations with supervisor-
agent collusion are very limited.5 Laffont (1990) examines a hidden gaming inwhich the supervisor
can extort an agent by producing a negative report on the agent’s individual contribution to the
multiple-agent team. Laffont (1990) finds that if information is hard, the optimal payment scheme
should be purely personalized; if, however, information is soft, it may be optimal to utilize some
of the aggregate information to design the incentive scheme. We study a similar setting with soft
information only. Our analyses contribute to this strand of literature by eliciting the reasons and
characterizing the conditions under which allowing collusion benefits the principal. More inter-
estingly, in such a multiple-agent environment, the collusive-supervision contract can sometimes
even dominate the collusion-free contract with honest supervision.
Compared to a single-agent setting, the design of incentive schemes with multiple agents is
more complicated because the output level depends on the joint effort of all agents. Therefore,
when tailoring the payment scheme to an agent, the principalmust account for the linkage between
the effort of this agent and that of the other agent. In other words, in designing the contract, the
principal needs to decide whether an agent’s payment scheme should be tied to the performance
of other agent(s) and, if so, how. A large body of literature has been established to rationalize
both arguments of individual performance and team performance. See, for example, Hart and
Holmstrom (1987); Ishiguro (2004); Bag and Pepito (2012); Ryall and Sampson (2016); Biener et al.
(2018).
The characterizations of the no-supervision contract and the collusion-proof contract are in
the line of individual performance, whereby an agent’s reward is based on his own signal but not
the other agent’s. Nevertheless, the characterization of the collusive-supervision contract shows
a special feature that combines both performance measures: If the agent’s signal is negative, his
rewards depend on the other agent’s signal; if, however, his signal is positive, his reward does
not depend on the other agent’s signal. This feature echoes several existing results when using
aggregate information (Laffont, 1990) and relative-performance evaluation (Che and Yoo, 2001) in
team production environments.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: We provide the model setup in Section 2.
Sections 3 and 4 present the no-supervision contract and the collusion-proof contract, respectively,
5Most previous studies on contract design inmultiple-agent organizations focus on the possibility of collusion among
the agents. See, for example, Holmström andMilgrom (1990); Itoh (1993); Laffont andMartimort (1997, 2000); Baliga and
Sjostrom (1998); Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004); Severinov (2008); Kvaløy and Olsen (2019). In contrast, we examine
the issue of supervisor-agent collusion in the multiple-agent setting.
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as two benchmark cases. Section 5 shows how allowing collusion improves the incentive provision
and characterizes the collusive-supervision contract. In Section 6, we discuss the robustness of
our result when relaxing some assumptions. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are presented in the
Appendix A.
2 Model Setup
Players and actions. We consider a three-level hierarchy with a principal, a supervisor, and two
symmetric agents indexed by i “ A,B. The principal is the owner of a firm and hires two agents
as the productive units in the firm. Agent i can choose to either shirk or work, denoted by effort
levels ei “ 0 and ei “ 1, respectively. Let e ” peA, eBq denote the pair of the two agents’ efforts.
The principal cannot observe the effort levels of agents.
After production, the output, y P tH,Lu, is realized and publicly observed, where H and L
denote high and low output, respectively. We assume that H ą L ą 0 and pH ´ Lq is sufficiently
large such that the principal strictly prefers that both agents work, i.e., e “ p1, 1q. Therefore, in
designing the incentive schemes, the principal aims to minimize the expected total payments from
implementing e “ p1, 1q. The probability of obtaining output H depends on both agents’ efforts.
Let ppeq P r0, 1s denote the probability that output H is realized, given e. The production process
is teamwork, and thus, there is no separable output from an individual agent. The expected level
of output is ppeqH ` p1 ´ ppeqqL. If both agents work, the probability of obtaining H is one, i.e.,
pp1, 1q “ 1. If one or both agents shirk, then the output may still be high with some probability,
characterized by 1 “ pp1, 1q ą pp0, 1q ą pp0, 0q ą 0. By assuming pp1, 1q “ 1, the agents face no
uncertainty from the production technologywhen they bothwork. This setting facilities our focus-
ing on the uncertainty entailed by the supervisory technology and clearly identifying the trade-off
between the loss from supervisor-agent collusion and the risk from inefficient supervision.6 By the
symmetry of agents, we have p1 ” pp0, 1q “ pp1, 0q. This parameter p1 measures how easy it is for
an agent to free ride on the other agent.
Agent i has a utility function Upwi, eiq “ upwiq ´ϕei, where wi is the payment agent i receives,
and ϕ ą 0 denotes the disutility level of working. upwiq satisfies up0q “ 0, u1p¨q ą 0 and u2p¨q ď 0.
To ensure the existence of equilibrium, we assume that upwiq satisfies the Inada conditions: u1p0q “
`8, and u1p`8q “ 0. Each agent accepts the contract as long as zero reservation utility is satisfied.
The supervisor is risk neutral and has zero reservation utility. After production, she collects
a signal θ of the agents’ effort levels from the state space Θ ” tp1, 1q, p0, 1q, p1, 0q, p0, 0qu. For each
6In Section 6.1, we show that the main results hold in the presence of production uncertainty, i.e., 0 ă pp1, 1q ă 1.
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signal θ, the first element represents the signal of agent A’s effort level, and the second represents
the signal of agent B’s. The agents can also observe the signal θ. The supervisory technology is
imperfect, which means that the supervisor can be either efficient or inefficient with probability λ
and p1´λq, respectively. The parameter λ P r0, 1s captures the supervisory efficiency, which reflects
the supervisor’s ability to collect an accurate signal. If the supervisor is efficient, then the observed
signal is accurate, i.e., θ “ e. If the supervisor is inefficient, she observes a random signal, that is,
each θ P Θ is randomly observed with an equal probability of 1{4. When the supervisor observes
an incorrect signal, i.e., θ ‰ e, we interpret this as a mistake by the supervisor.7 After collecting
the signal, the supervisor sends a report r P Θ about both agents’ effort levels to the principal.
In the hierarchy, the principal contracts with the two agents and the supervisor before produc-
tion. The contract specifies the conditions under which the supervisory information will be used
and stipulates wage transfers wyAprq ě 0 and wyBprq ě 0 to the agents and a wage transfer syprq ě 0
to the supervisor according to output y and report r. After production, the principal collects the
realized output y, and the supervisor observes a signal θ P Θ and strategically chooses a report r
to maximize her payoff (in that she may collude with one or both of the agents to manipulate the
signal). The principal then pays the transfers wyi prq to agent i and syprq to the supervisor following
the contract.
Signal manipulation and side contract. After observing the signal but before reporting to the
principal, the supervisor and the agents can choose to collude and manipulate the signal to favor
their effort levels, i.e., reporting 1with a signal of 0. Formally, information is soft for the supervisor-
agent coalition in the sense that (i) the observed signal θ is not verifiable and can be manipulated
costlessly, and (ii) the supervisor needs to collaborate with agent i to report r ‰ θ. In other words,
the supervisor cannot forge information by herself, or it is too costly to do so without the agents’
cooperation.
We model the collusion process as a side contract between the agent(s) and the supervisor that
is assumed to be fully enforceable and unobservable by the principal. The side contract stipulates
monetary transfers according to the realization of output y, signal θ, and report r. Denote the final
payments to agent i and the supervisor in the coalition as wyi pr|θq and sypr|θq, respectively. After
signal manipulation, the members in the coalition divide the total payment by a Pareto efficient
bargaining procedure that requires each party in the coalition to receive more than from choosing
not to collude.8
7The overall probabilities that the supervisor collects a wrong and a correct signal are given by 3
4
p1 ´ λq and λ `
1
4
p1´ λq, respectively.
8In Section 5.3, for the characterization of the collusive-supervision contract in the hierarchy, we assume that the side
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The supervisor and the agentswill not colludewhen they are indifferent between colluding and
not colluding. In this case, the supervisor reports truthfully (r “ θ), and we have wyi prq “ wyi pθq
and syprq “ sypθq. A coalition is formed if and only if it strictly benefits all members. Hence, for a
coalition between agent i and the supervisor, wyi pr|θq and sypr|θqmust satisfy
wyi pr|θq ` sypr|θq “ wyi prq ` syprq for r ‰ θ,(1)
wyi pr|θq ą wyi pθq and sypr|θq ą sypθq for r ‰ θ.(2)
We say that a contract allows collusion if there exists some combination of θ and r such that (1) and
(2) hold. For example, if the contract has the feature that wHA p1, 1q` sHp1, 1q ą wHA p0, 1q` sHp0, 1q,
when observing output y “ H and θ “ p0, 1q, the supervisor can cooperatewith agent A and report
r “ p1, 1q and then split the total payment wHA p1, 1q ` sHp1, 1q. Following the same definition, if
the supervisor colludes with both agents, then it must be that
wyApr|θq ` wyBpr|θq ` sypr|θq “ wyAprq ` wyBprq ` syprq for r ‰ θ,(3)
wyApr|θq ą wyApθq, wyBpr|θq ą wyBpθq, and sypr|θq ą sypθq for r ‰ θ.(4)
The objective of the supervisor-agent coalition is to forge a report r that maximizes the total pay-
ment from the principal.
Timing. Given the setup above, the timing of the game is as follows:
(1) The principal offers a contract specifying payments twyAprq, wyBprq, syprqu.
(2) The two agents and the supervisor decidewhether to accept or reject the contract. If any of them
rejects the contract, the game ends, and all parties receive their respective reservation utilities.
(3) If the contract has been accepted, the two agents simultaneously decidewhether towork (ei “ 1)
or to shirk (ei “ 0).
(4) The output y is realized and observed by all parties.
(5) The signal θ is realized and observed by the supervisor and the two agents.
(6) The supervisor and the agent(s) choose whether to collude andmake a side contract. If the side
contract is rejected, the supervisor will play non-cooperatively.
(7) The supervisor makes the report r to the principal.
(8) Transfers are paid according to the contract (and the side contract if necessary).
contract is implemented through a Nash bargaining game.
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3 No-Supervision Contract
In the hierarchy, the supervisor may be inefficient and provide an incorrect signal. In addition,
she may collude with the agent(s) against the principal’s interests. The easiest way to avoid both
problems is not to use the supervisory information. In this case, syprq “ 0, for all r and y. Agents’
payments are based solely on output y, i.e., wyi prq “ wyi for all r. We refer to this contract as the
no-supervision (no) contract.
The principal’s objective is to implement the effort choice e “ p1, 1q with the minimum total
paymentsCno “ pp1, 1qpwHA `wHB q`p1´pp1, 1qqpwLA`wLBq “ wHA `wHB . We focus on the symmetric
contract and take agent A as the representative. Given that agent B chooses to work (eB “ 1), the
participation (IR) and the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints for agent A are
upwHA q ´ ϕ ě 0,(IRno)
upwHA q ´ ϕ ě p1upwHA q ` p1´ p1qupwLAq.(ICno)
Given that the payments to agents are symmetric, the principal’s cost-minimization problem is
min Cno “ 2wHA
subject to pIRnoq, pICnoq, and wyi ě 0, @ i “ A,B and y “ H,L.
(Pno)
Note that (IRno) is satisfied when (ICno) is satisfied. The solution to (Pno) is the no-supervision
contract as follows.
Proposition 1. In the no-supervision contract, wLi “ 0 and wHi “ wˆHno for i “ A,B, where wˆHno is
determined by equation
(xICno) p1´ p1qupwˆHnoq “ ϕ.
The total payment of the principal is Cˆno “ 2wˆHno.
In the absence of supervision, the principal compensates the agents only when the output is
high.
4 Collusion-Proof Supervision
Next, we characterize the collusion-proof (cp) contract that leaves no incentive for the supervisor
and the agents to collude. Perusing the collusion-proof contract helps us see the value of imperfect
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supervisory information, and we show that the collusion-proof contract indeed dominates the no-
supervision contract when supervisory efficiency is sufficiently high.
We define collusion between the supervisor and both agents as a full-coalition, i.e., given θ “
p0, 0q, the supervisor colluding with both agents reports r “ p1, 1q. We define collusion between
the supervisor and only one of the two agents as a sub-coalition, i.e., given θ “ p0, 1q (θ “ p1, 0q),
the supervisor colludes with agent A (B) and reports r “ p1, 1q. Let T yprq ” wyAprq`wyBprq` syprq
denote the aggregate transfer made by the principal to the two agents and the supervisor. wyi prq`
syprq represents the aggregate transfers to agent i and the supervisor. To prevent the full-coalition,
the principal must ensure that reporting the truth does not result in strictly less joint payments
for all possible coalitions, that is, satisfying the following coalition incentive compatibility (CIC)
constraints (Tirole, 1992):
T ypθq ě T yprq, @ θ, r P Θ.
Given output y, to satisfy constraints T ypθq ě T yprq, the aggregate payments to the two agents and
the supervisor must be exactly the same across the four signal states:
(CICf ) T yp1, 1q “ T yp1, 0q “ T yp0, 1q “ T yp0, 0q.
Similarly, to prevent sub-coalitions, given the other agent’s signal, the payments to agent i and the
supervisor must be the same:
wyAp1, 1q ` syp1, 1q “ wyAp0, 1q ` syp0, 1q,
wyAp1, 0q ` syp1, 0q “ wyAp0, 0q ` syp0, 0q,
wyBp1, 1q ` syp1, 1q “ wyBp1, 0q ` syp1, 0q,
wyBp0, 1q ` syp0, 1q “ wyBp0, 0q ` syp0, 0q.
(CICs)
From (CICf ) and (CICs), we can easily derive the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Collusion-proofness implies the following payment features to the agents:
(a) wyAp1, 0q “ wyAp1, 1q and wyAp0, 1q “ wyAp0, 0q for y “ L,H ;
(b) wyBp0, 1q “ wyBp1, 1q and wyBp1, 0q “ wyBp0, 0q for y “ L,H .
Therefore, to fully deter both types of coalitions, the incentive scheme for an agent should de-
pend only on the signal of this agent but not on the other agent’s. This feature will help us derive
the collusion-proof contract. Taking agent A as the representative, given that eB “ 1 and the su-
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pervisor reports truthfully, the IR constraint is
(IRcp) λupwHA p1, 1qq ` p1´ λq14
”
upwHA p1, 1qq ` upwHA p1, 0qq ` upwHA p0, 1qq ` upwHA p0, 0qq
ı
´ ϕ ě 0,
and the IC constraint is
λupwHA p1, 1qq ` p1´ λq14
”
upwHA p1, 1qq ` upwHA p1, 0qq ` upwHA p0, 1qq ` upwHA p0, 0qq
ı
´ ϕ
ě p1
#
λupwHA p0, 1qq ` p1´ λq14
”
upwHA p1, 1qq ` upwHA p1, 0qq ` upwHA p0, 1qq ` upwHA p0, 0qq
ı+
` p1´ p1q
#
λupwLAp0, 1qq ` p1´ λq14
”
upwLAp1, 1qq ` upwLAp1, 0qq ` upwLAp0, 1qq ` upwLAp0, 0qq
ı+
.
(ICcp)
where the left-hand side of (ICcp) is the expected payoff when agent A works, and the two terms
following λ and 1´λ represent the payoffs when the supervisor is efficient and inefficient, respec-
tively. The right-hand side of (ICcp) is the payoffwhen agent A shirks, and the two terms following
p1 and p1´ p1q are the payoffs when the output is realized to be high and low, respectively.
The principal solves the following cost-minimization problem for the collusion-proof contract:
min Ccp “ λTHp1, 1q ` p1´ λq1
4
”
THp1, 1q ` THp1, 0q ` THp0, 1q ` THp0, 0q
ı
“ 2wHA p1, 1q ` sHp1, 1q,
subject to pCICf q, pCICsq, pIRcpq, pICcpq,
wyprq ě 0, syprq ě 0, @ r P Θ, i “ A,B and y “ H,L.
(Pcp)
The solution to (Pcp) is described in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Define λ˚ “ 1´p11`p1 .
(a) If λ ă λ˚, the principal adopts the no-supervision contract in Proposition 1.
(b) If λ ě λ˚, the collusion-proof contract is as follows:
(b1) For y “ L, the agents and the supervisor do not obtain any rewards, i.e., wLi prq “ sLprq “ 0,
@ r P Θ, i “ A,B.
(b2) For y “ H , the payment structure is
10
Report r Agent A Agent B Supervisor S
p1, 1q w˜Hcp w˜Hcp 0
p1, 0q w˜Hcp 0 w˜Hcp
p0, 1q 0 w˜Hcp w˜Hcp
p0, 0q 0 0 2w˜Hcp
where w˜Hcp is determined by equation
(ĂICcp) λupw˜Hcpq ` 12p1´ p1qp1´ λqupw˜Hcpq “ ϕ.
The principal incurs a total cost of C˜cp “ 2w˜Hcp.
Proposition 2 shows how supervisory efficiency, measured by the parameter λ, affects the prin-
cipal’s contract choices. The collusion-proof contract is favorable only when supervisory informa-
tion is sufficiently accurate, i.e., λ ě λ˚. If the supervisor’s signal is not accurate enough, the
principal will prefer the no-supervision contract, in which the supervisory signal is ignored.
To prevent all possibilities of collusion, (ICcp), (CICf ), and (CICs) must be satisfied in the prin-
cipal’s cost-minimization problem. However, it is possible that an agent works but is nevertheless
punished by the principal because the supervisor observes an incorrect signal. This potential mis-
take by the supervisor creates a conflict between truthful reporting and incentive provision. In
other words, deterring collusion entails a risk of punishing a working agent due to incorrect su-
pervisory signals. As a result, the agents require risk premiums to work, which raises the cost of
implementing the collusion-proof contract.
5 Collusive Supervision
We have shown that the inefficient and manipulable supervisory technology is still valuable to
the principal. However, when the collusion-proof contract prevents signal manipulation, it gives
rise to the possibility that an inefficient supervisor reports a mistaken signal and harms the agents.
Thus, in what follows, we explore the possibility of striking a balance in the trade-off between the
loss from supervisor-agent collusion and the risk from inefficient supervision.
5.1 Incentive improvement by allowing collusion
When collusion is tolerated, the (CICf ) and (CICs) constraints are removed from the princi-
pal’s optimization problem. In designing the contract, the principal needs to consider signal ma-
nipulation and the payoffs resulting from the supervisor-agent collusion. Given that the principal
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always wants to implement e “ p1, 1q, the aggregate transfers to the two agents and the supervisor
under signal (1, 1) should be no less than under other signals, that is,9
(5) T yp1, 1q ě T yprq @ r “ tp1, 0q, p0, 1q, p0, 0qu, y “ L,H.
Hence, we can restrict our attention to the cases in which the supervisor-agent coalition make a
positive adjustment of the signal instead of a negative adjustment. Taking agent A as the represen-
tative, there are three relevant cases of collusion. First, given θ “ p0, 0q, form a sub-coalition and
report r “ p1, 0q. Second, given θ “ p0, 0q, form a full-coalition and report r “ p1, 1q. Third, given
θ “ p0, 1q, form a sub-coalition and report r “ p1, 1q.
Further, (5) implies that, when θ “ p1, 1q, the supervisor always truthfully reports r “ p1, 1q.
Hence, there is no need to reward the supervisor when she reports r “ p1, 1q, that is,
(6) syp1, 1q “ 0 for y “ L,H.
When the signal is θ “ p1, 0q, p0, 1q, and p0, 0q, there may be upward adjustment of the report. We
use the notationswHi pr|10q,wHi pr|01q, andwHi pr|00q to denote agent i’s final payment after possible
signal manipulation.
With the above analysis, we write the IC constraint of the representative agent A as follows
λupwHA p1, 1qq ` p1´ λq14
”
upwHA p1, 1qq ` upwHA pr|10qq ` upwHA pr|01qq ` upwHA pr|00qq
ı
´ ϕ
ě p1
#
λupwHA pr|01qq ` p1´ λq14
”
upwHA p1, 1qq ` upwHA pr|10qq ` upwHA pr|01qq ` upwHA pr|00qq
ı+
` p1´ p1q
#
λupwLApr|01qq ` p1´ λq14
”
upwLAp1, 1qq ` upwLApr|10qq ` upwLApr|01qq ` upwLApr|00qq
ı+
.
(ICcs)
We now focus on discussing (ICcs) for collusive supervision. On the left-hand side of (ICcs),
the terms upwHA pr|10qq, upwHA pr|01qq, and upwHA pr|00qq capture the potential benefit of allowing col-
lusion. Because the contract implements e “ p1, 1q, if the signal is θ “ p1, 0q, p0, 1q, or p0, 0q, this
must be the supervisor’s mistake due to inefficient supervision. Hence, if the supervisor makes
a positive adjustment of the signal in her report, this corrective signal manipulation enlarges the
left-hand side of (ICcs) and thus increases the agent’s incentive to work. However, if collusion for
signal manipulation is allowed, the right-hand side of (ICcs) will also increase because an agent
9Otherwise, for example, if T yp1, 1q ă T yp1, 0q, then agents will always choose e “ p1, 0q over e “ p1, 1q. The
principal cannot implement e “ p1, 1q.
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can shirk and bribe the agent to manipulate his signal. Given this trade-off between the risk from
inefficient supervision and the loss from collusion, we now attempt to identify whether and under
what conditions allowing supervisor-agent collusion would (i) generate a higher incentive for the
agents to work and (ii) lead to an improvement over the no-supervision and the collusion-proof
implementations.
We first rewrite (ICcs) in the form of Zcs ě 0, where
Zcs ”
”
λ` 1
4
p1´ p1qp1´ λq
ı
upwHA p1, 1qqloooooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooooon
Term 1
`
”1
4
p1´ p1qp1´ λq
ı
upwHA pr|10qqloooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooon
Term 2
`
”1
4
p1´ p1qp1´ λq
ı
upwHA pr|00qqloooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooon
Term 3
`
”1
4
p1´ p1qp1´ λq ´ λp1
ı
upwHA pr|01qqloooooooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooooooon
Term 4
´ p1´ p1q
#
λupwLApr|01qq ` p1´ λq14
”
upwLAp1, 1qq ` upwLApr|10qq ` upwLApr|01qq ` upwLApr|00qq
ı+
looooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
Term 5
´ϕ.
We then examine the maximization of Z term-by-term by choosing the payments. The analysis
helps us to determine whether (certain types of) collusion would generate a higher incentive for
the agents to work. The results are presented sequentially in Lemmas 2-6.
It is clear that the principal should minimize Term 5 by setting all payments associated with
output L to zero. In this case, the supervisory information is useless, so the supervisor should also
be rewarded with zero payment.
Lemma 2. In the collusive-supervision contract, it is optimal for the principal not to reward the agents and
the supervisor for y “ L, i.e., wLi prq “ sLprq “ 0, @ r P Θ, i “ A,B.
When the output is low, allowing any supervisor-agent coalition to manipulate the signal would
not improve the agents’ incentive to work but have the opposite effect. Thus, offering zero payoffs
to the agents and the supervisor across all possible signals is optimal.
Next, for Term 1, because λ ` 14p1 ´ p1qp1 ´ λq ě 0, when y “ H and r “ p1, 1q, raising the
payment wHA p1, 1q increases the agent’s incentive to work. Denote wˇHcs as the payment to agent A
that implements e “ p1, 1q, which will be determined by the principal’s cost minimization problem
or, specifically, the binding IC constraint (see the analysis in the following). In this case, by (6), the
supervisor should be rewarded with zero payment, i.e., sHp1, 1q “ 0.
Lemma 3. In the collusive-supervision contract, the principal should set wHA p1, 1q “ wHB p1, 1q “ wˇHcs and
sHp1, 1q “ 0, where wˇHcs is the equilibrium payment level that satisfies (ICcs) for both agents.
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Now, consider Terms 2 associated with signal θ “ p1, 0q. Obtaining this signal must result from
an inefficient supervisor. Apparently, 14p1 ´ p1qp1 ´ λq ě 0, and thus, raising wHA pr|10q provides
a greater incentive for agent A to work. Therefore, to maximize Zcs, when the signal is θ “ p1, 0q,
the principal should reward agent A with wHA pr|10q “ wˇHcs for r “ p1, 1q and p1, 0q; by symmetry,
wHB pr|01q “ wˇHcs for r “ p1, 1q and p0, 1q. This implies the following result.
Lemma 4. In the collusive-supervision contract, it is optimal to reward an agent if his own signal is positive,
regardless of the other agent’s signal, i.e., wHA p1, 1q “ wHA p1, 0q “ wˇHcs, and wHB p1, 1q “ wHB p0, 1q “ wˇHcs.
Therefore, agent A will not have the incentive to collude given θ “ p1, 0q. However, note that by
(5), T p1, 0q ď T p1, 1q, and thus, wHB p1, 0q ` sHp1, 0q ď wHB p1, 1q ` sHp1, 1q “ wˇHcs. Hence, given
θ “ p1, 0q, depending on the reward schemes, the supervisor may collude with agent B and report
r “ p1, 1q.
We now turn to Term 3, which requires more discussion. Similar to Term 2, obtaining a signal
θ “ p0, 0q indicates that the supervisor is inefficient. Because 14p1´p1qp1´λq ě 0, a higherwHA pr|00q
provides a greater incentive for agent A to work. Given θ “ p0, 0q, there are three possible reports:
r “ p1, 1q, p1, 0q, and p0, 0q, corresponding to a full-coalition, a sub-coalition, and truthful reporting,
respectively.
First, consider the full-coalition case. If the full-coalition is allowed by setting T p1, 1q ą T p0, 0q,
the report is r “ p1, 1q, and the total payment is THp1, 1q “ wHA p1, 1q ` wHB p1, 1q “ 2wˇHcs. Two
agents and the supervisor divide this payment THp1, 1q “ wHA p11|00q ` wHB p11|00q ` sHp11|00q.
The supervisor must receive a strictly positive payoff (sHp11|00q ą 0) to manipulate the signal, so
wHA p11|00q ă wˇHcs. Alternatively, the full-coalition can be prevented by setting THp1, 1q “ THp0, 0q
with wHA p0, 0q “ wHB p0, 0q “ wˇHcs and sHp0, 0q “ 0. This provides agent A with a greater incentive
because wHA p11|00q ă wHA p0, 0q “ wˇHcs. Therefore, instead of allowing the full-coalition, rewarding
the agents directly as though they were working provides a higher incentive. In other words, full-
coalition between the agents and the supervisor should be prevented in the collusive-supervision
contract. In summary,
(7) THp1, 1q “ THp0, 0q “ 2wˇHcs and sp0, 0q “ 0.
Second, consider the sub-coalition case. If sub-coalition with agent A is implemented, then
wHA p1, 0q ` sp1, 0q ą wHA p0, 0q ` sp0, 0q “ wˇHcs. From (5) and (7), THp1, 0q ď THp0, 0q “ 2wˇHcs. These
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two inequalities yield the following
wHB p1, 0q “ THp1, 0q ´
“
wHA p1, 0q ` sHp1, 0q
‰
ă THp1, 0q ´ wHcs
ď 2wˇHcs ´ wˇHcs
“ wˇHcs,
which means that agent B’s incentive to work is jeopardized. Thus, to prevent agent A and the
supervisor from manipulating θ “ p0, 0q into r “ p1, 0q, the principal should set sHp1, 0q “ 0. By
symmetry, sHp0, 1q “ 0.
We now summarize the payment schemes and collusion issues when θ “ p0, 0q as follows.
Lemma 5. In the collusive-supervision contract,
(a) the payment schemes to the agents and the supervisor under signals p0, 0q and p1, 1q are the same, i.e.,
wHA p1, 1q “ wHA p0, 0q “ wˇHcs and sHp1, 1q “ sHp0, 0q “ 0; by symmetry, wHB p1, 1q “ wHB p0, 0q “
wˇHcs;
(b) a sub-coalition that manipulates θ “ p0, 0q into r “ p1, 0q or p0, 1q should be prevented, and therefore,
sHp1, 0q “ sHp0, 1q “ 0.
Note that the payment schemes to prevent the full-coalition are different in the collusion-proof
contract and the collusive-supervision contract. This difference reflects the fact that satisfying the
CIC constraints raises the cost of satisfying the IC constraint. With the observation of signal (0, 0),
Term 3 indicates that a higher payment induces a greater incentive for the agent to work, as 14p1´
p1qp1´λq ě 0. However, the implementation of theCIC constraints requires the principal to reward
the supervisor, and that in turn discourages the agents from working. Finally, we consider Term
4. With signal θ “ p0, 1q, there are two possibilities: First, agent A works, but the signal is wrong;
second, agent A shirks, and the signal is correct. Therefore, the coefficient in front of wHA pr|01q can
be positive or negative. Let
(8) λ ” 1´ p1
1` 3p1 .
Apparently, if λ ď λ, 14p1´p1qp1´λq´λp1 ě 0, then a higherwHA pr|01q provides a greater incentive
for agent A to work. If, however, λ ą λ, a lower wHA pr|01q provides a greater incentive for agent A
to work. We now separately examine these two cases.
When λ ď λ, from Lemma 4, wHB p0, 1q “ wˇHcs. From Lemma 3, we know that agent A’s payment
from the sub-coalition, wHA p11|01q, cannot be more than wˇHcs. Alternatively, setting wHA p01|01q “
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wˇHcs, which implies that wHA p0, 1q “ wˇHcs, provides a greater incentive for agent A to work. Further-
more, combining the results in Lemmas 2-5, we can simplify function Zcs:
Zcs “
”
λ` 1
4
p1´ p1qp1´ λq
ı
upwHA p1, 1qq `
”1
4
p1´ p1qp1´ λq
ı
upwHA p1, 0qq
`
”1
4
p1´ p1qp1´ λq
ı
upwHA p0, 0qq `
”1
4
p1´ p1qp1´ λq ´ λp1
ı
upwHA p0, 1qq ´ ϕ.
Given that wHA p1, 1q “ wHA p1, 0q “ wHA p0, 1q “ wHA p0, 0q “ wˇHcs, we have Zcs “ p1 ´ p1qupwˇHcsq ´ ϕ.
The equilibrium IC constraint, p1´ p1qupwˇHcsq´ϕ “ 0, is the same as (xICno) for the no-supervision
contract, which implies that wˇHcs “ wˆHno. Thus, when λ ď λ, all payment variation in the collusive-
supervision contract is due to y. Allowing collusion cannot improve the agents’ incentives over the
no-supervision contract.
Now, consider the case when λ ą λ, in which lowering wHA pr|01q increases agent A’s incentive
to work. Under the sub-coalition, wHA p11|01q ` sHp11|01q “ wHA p1, 1q ` sHp1, 1q “ wˇHcs, where
sHp1, 1q “ 0 by (6). To form the coalition, the supervisor must receive sHp11|01q ą 0, so agent
A receives wHA p11|01q ă wˇHcs. As collusion can lower wHA pr|01q, agent A has a higher incentive
to work. This result indicates that when θ “ p0, 1q (or p1, 0q), the principal should allow agent
A (B) and the supervisor to form a sub-coalition that forges a report r “ p1, 1q and shares the
total payment wˇHcs. However, when the supervisory efficiency increases, the risk from mistaken
punishment becomes smaller, and therefore the benefit from allowing such a sub-coalition will
become smaller, in contrast to the collusion-proof implementation.
Summarizing the discussion above yields the following result.
Lemma 6. In the collusive-supervision contract,
(a) if λ ď λ, it is optimal to reward the agent regardless of the signal, i.e., wHA p1, 1q “ wHA p1, 0q “
wHA p0, 1q “ wHA p0, 0q “ wˇHcs for agent A. The contract is equivalent to the no-supervision contract;
(b) if λ ą λ, it is optimal to allow a sub-coalition, i.e., given wHA p1, 1q “ wˇHcs and wHA p0, 1q “ 0 and
sp1, 1q “ sp0, 0q “ 0, agent A colludes with the supervisor under signal p0, 1q to report r “ p1, 1q.
With the side contract, agent A receives wHA p11|01q and the supervisor receives sHp11|01q, where
wHA p11|01q ` sHp11|01q “ wHA p1, 1q “ wˇHcs.
The following proposition summarizes the payment scheme in the collusive-supervision con-
tract derived by Lemmas 2-6.
Proposition 3. Given λ ą λ, the collusive-supervision contract has the following features:
(a) wLAprq “ 0 @ r P Θ, and wHA p1, 1q “ wHA p1, 0q “ wHA p0, 0q and wHA p0, 1q “ 0;
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(b) wLBprq “ 0 @ r P Θ, and wHB p1, 1q “ wHB p0, 1q “ wHB p0, 0q and wHB p1, 0q “ 0;
(c) syprq “ 0 @ r P Θ, and y “ L,H ;
(d) The full-coalition is prevented as wHi p1, 1q “ wHi p0, 0q;
(e) A sub-coalition between agent A (B) and the supervisor occurs when θ “ p0, 1q (θ “ p1, 0q).
Proposition 3 shows that allowing a certain type of collusion provides higher incentives for the
agents to work. Note that, in the collusion-proof contract, the principal directly rewards the super-
visor in return for her truthfully reporting the signal. However, under collusive supervision, the
principal does not directly reward the supervisor. The supervisor only obtains a positive payment
from the sub-coalition allowed by the contract. Proposition 3 also shows that, in the collusive-
supervision contract, an agent’s compensation scheme is determined by both individual and team
performance measures: If the agent’s signal is positive, his reward does not depend on the other
agent’s signal; if, however, his signal is negative, his reward depends on the other agent’s signal.
With these results, the IC constraint is simplified to
λupwHA p1, 1qq ` p1´ λq14
”
upwHA p1, 1qq ` upwHA p1, 1qq ` upwHA p11|01qq ` upwHA p1, 1qq
ı
´ ϕ
ě p1
#
λupwHA p11|01qq ` p1´ λq14
”
upwHA p1, 1qq ` upwHA p1, 1qq ` upwHA p11|01q ` upwHA p1, 1qq
ı+
.
(ICcs)
The corresponding IR constraint is
(IRcs) λupwHA p1, 1qq`p1´λq14
”
upwHA p1, 1qq`upwHA p1, 1qq`upwHA p11|01qq`upwHA p1, 1qq
ı
´ϕ ě 0,
which will be satisfied as long as (ICcs) holds.
From the analysis above, we can then write the principal’s cost minimization problem to im-
plement e “ p1, 1q as follows
min Ccs “ λTHp1, 1q ` p1´ λq1
4
”
THp1, 1q ` THp11|10q ` THp11|01q ` THp0, 0q
ı
subject to pIRcsq, pICcsq,
wyi prq ě 0, wyi pr|θq ě 0, syprq ě 0, sypr|θq ě 0,@ r P Θ, θ P Θ, i “ A,B.
(Pcs)
The solution to (Pcs) can be directly obtained from Proposition 3. Let us use α P p0, 1q to capture
the share of the equilibrium payment wˇHcs that the collusive agent obtains as the Pareto efficient
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bargaining outcome in the sub-coalition when manipulating θ “ p0, 1q (θ “ p1, 0q) to report p1, 1q,
i.e., wHA p11|10q “ αwˇHcs. In this case, the supervisor receives p1 ´ αqwˇHcs from the agent as the side
payment or bribe.
Proposition 4. Given λ ě λ, the collusive-supervision contract is as follows:
(a) For y “ L, the agents and the supervisor do not obtain any rewards.
(b) For y “ H , the payment structure is
Report r Agent A Agent B Supervisor S
p1, 1q wˇHcs wˇHcs 0
p1, 0q wˇHcs 0 0
p0, 1q 0 wˇHcs 0
p0, 0q wˇHcs wˇHcs 0
where wˇHcs is determined by the equation
(|ICcs) λ“upwˇHcsq ´ p1upαwˇHcsq‰` p1´ λqp1´ p1q“34upwˇHcsq ` 14upαwˇHcsq‰ “ ϕ.
The principal pays a total amount Cˇcs “ 2wˇHcs.
5.2 Comparisons across contracts
Now, we are prepared to compare (ICcs) with (ICno) and (ICcp) to identify the conditions un-
der which implementing the collusive-supervision contract is better than implementing the no-
supervision and the collusion-proof contracts. Propositions 1-3 show that all payments associated
with low output are zero. Let us then rewrite these IC constraints in the form of Z ě 0, where
Zno “ p1´ p1qupwHA p1, 1qq ´ ϕ,
Zcp “ λupwHA p1, 1qq ` 12p1´ p1qp1´ λqupw
H
A p1, 1qq ´ ϕ,
Zcs “ λupwHA p1, 1qq ´ p1λupwHA p11|01qq ` p1´ p1qp1´ λq14
“
3upwHA p1, 1qq ` upwHA p11|01qq
‰´ ϕ.
We first compare the no-supervision contract and collusive-supervision contract. The differ-
ence between Zcs and Zno is
Zcs ´ Zno “
“
λ` 3
4
p1´ p1qp1´ λq ´ p1´ p1q
‰
upwHA p1, 1qq `
“1
4
p1´ p1qp1´ λq ´ λp1
‰
upwHA p11|01qq
“ “λp1 ´ 1
4
p1´ p1qp1´ λq
‰“
upwHA p1, 1qq ´ upwHA p11|01qq
‰
.
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Clearly, Zcs ´ Zno is increasing in λ. From (1) and (2), upwHA p1, 1qq ´ upwHA p11|01qq ą 0. From (8),
λp1´ 14p1´ p1qp1´λq ă 0 if and only if λ ą λ. Therefore, Zcs´Zno ą 0 if and only if λ ą λ. In this
case, collusive supervision provides greater incentives for the agents to work. The cutoff value of
supervisory efficiency, λ “ 1´p11`3p1 , decreases in p1. Intuitively, when p1 becomes large, it is easier
for one agent to free ride on the other, so the no-supervision contract is less preferred. It is easy to
see that λ ă λ˚ “ 1´p11`p1 .
Next, we compare the collusion-proof contract and collusive supervision. Similarly, we take
the difference between Zcs and Zcp.
Zcs ´ Zcp “ 1
4
p1´ p1qp1´ λqupwHA p1, 1qq `
“1
4
p1´ p1qp1´ λq ´ λp1
‰
upwHA p11|01qq
“ 1
4
p1´ p1qp1´ λq
“
upwHA p1, 1qq ´ upwHA p11|01qq
‰´ λp1upwHA p11|01qq.(9)
When λ “ 1, Zcs ´ Zcp ă 0, the collusion-proof contract provides a higher incentive. Thus,
when there is no inefficient supervision, the principal should adopt the collusion-proof contract.
When λ “ λ˚ “ 1´p11`p1 , we have Zcs ´ Zcp ą 0. Moreover,
dpZcs ´ Zcpq
dλ
“ ´1
4
p1´ p1q ´ p1upwHA p11|01qq ă 0,
so Zcs ´ Zcp is decreasing in λ P rλ˚, 1s. Hence, there must exist a unique cutoff value, denoted by
λ P pλ˚, 1q, such that Zcs ´ Zcp “ 0. Zcs ą Zcp if and only if λ P rλ˚, λq. The cutoff value,
(10) λ ” p1´ p1q
“
upwHp1, 1qq ` upwHA p11|01qq
‰“p1´ p1qupwHp1, 1qq ` p1` 3p1qupwHA p11|01qq‰ ,
depends on the agent’s utility function and the side contract. λ decreases in p1. A large p1 implies
a stronger incentive to free ride, and thus, the collusion-proof contract becomes more useful.
From the analysis above, we have the following result:
Proposition 5. There exist unique cutoffs of the supervisory efficiency parameter λ P p0, λ˚q and λ P pλ˚, 1q
such that if λ ă λ ă λ, collusive supervision induces a higher incentive for the agents to work than do no-
supervision and collusion-proof supervision.
The no-supervision, collusion-proof, and collusive-supervision contracts share a common fea-
ture: The total payment is two times the equilibrium wage, that is, Cˆno “ 2wˆHno, C˜cp “ 2w˜Hcp, and
Cˇcs “ 2wˇHcs, where wˆHno, w˜Hcp, and wˇHcs are obtained by making (ICno), (ICcp), and (ICcs) binding,
respectively. Therefore, from Proposition 5, we can conclude the following:
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Proposition 6. It is optimal for the principal to use
(a) the no-supervision contract if λ ď λ;
(b) the collusive-supervision contract if λ ă λ ă λ; and
(c) the collusion-proof contract if λ ě λ.
Tounderstand this result, wediscuss the gains and losses fromusing the inaccurate supervisory
signal. An agent is wrongly punished when he works but the signal is negative. To mitigate the
occurrence of this undesirable event, the collusive-supervision contract allows the agent to bribe
the supervisor (by the amount sp11|01q) and correct the wrong signal. As a result, the principal
gains from saving the risk premium payment to the agents. However, allowing collusion also
incurs a loss because it creates the possibility that an agent shirks and bribes the supervisor to
manipulate his report. In the case in which an agent shirks and his signal is negative, the agent
receives nothing under the collusion-proof contract but still receives a positive payment (wp11|01q)
under the collusive-supervision contract. Hence, collusion-proof supervision imposes a stronger
punishment for shirking.
When λ is small, the supervisory technology is inaccurate. Allowing the payments to depend
on the signal will expose the agents to excessive risks that require very high compensation. Hence,
it is better to adopt the no-supervision contract. When λ is large, the supervisory technology is
reliable enough, so it is optimal to let the payments be contingent on truthfully reported signals
obtained from collusion-proof implementation. When λ is the intermediate range rλ, λs, collusive
supervision balances the gains and losses from using the inefficient supervisory technology and
becomes the optimal way to provide incentives. Therefore, Proposition 6 demonstrates how the
principal should design the contract based on the trade-off between loss from collusion and the
risk from inefficient supervision.
5.3 Nash bargaining in the side contract
Based on the previous analysis, under collusive supervision, the supervisor colludeswith agent
A (respectively, agent B) to report r “ p1, 1q when the signal is θ “ p0, 1q (respectively, p1, 0q). The
side contract specifies payments wHA p11|01q and sHp11|01q when the signal is θ “ p0, 1q and the
supervisor reports r “ p1, 1q. We assume that, in the sub-coalition, they divide the gain from
collusion by a Nash bargaining procedure. Taking agent A as the representative, α P p0, 1q and
1´α capture the bargaining power of agent A and the supervisor, respectively. The corresponding
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Nash bargaining problem that determines wHA p11|01q and sHp11|01q is
max
“
wHA p11|01q ´ wHA p0, 1q
‰α“
sHp11|01q ´ sHp0, 1q‰1´α,
subject to wHA p11|01q ` sHp11|01q “ wHA p1, 1q ` sHp1, 1q.
(11)
From Proposition 3, sHp1, 1q “ 0, sHp0, 1q “ 0, wHA p11|01q “ wˇHcs, andwHA p0, 1q “ 0. The bargaining
problem reduces to max
“
wHA p11|01q
‰α“
sHp11|01q‰1´α s.t. wHA p11|01q` sHp11|01q “ wˇHcs,which has
the solution wHA p11|01q “ αwˇHcs and sHp11|01q “ p1 ´ αqwˇHcs. Furthermore, (10) can be written as
follows
(12) λ “ p1´ p1q
“
upwˇHcsq ` upαwˇHcsq
‰“p1´ p1qupwˇHcsq ` p1` 3p1qupαwˇHcsq‰ ,
Note that the principal’s choice between the collusive-supervision and collusion-proof con-
tracts depends on λ in (12) that varies with α. Hence, the bargaining powers affect the principal’s
contract choice and total payment in equilibrium. The following proposition summarize the result.
Proposition 7. Regarding the agent’s bargaining power α in the side contract, we find that
(a) λ is decreasing in α.
(b) For λ P rλ˚, 1s, if αÑ 0, then λÑ 1, and the collusive-supervision contract dominates the collusion-
proof contract; if αÑ 1, then λÑ λ˚, and the opposite dominance holds.
(c) For λ P rλ˚, 1s, Cˇcs is increasing in α.
Intuitively, if the agent has less bargaining power, having the supervisor manipulate the signal
requires a larger bribe. Hence, with a smaller α, the agent has less incentive to shirk even though
collusion is allowed, which reduces the downside of allowing collusion. As a result, the collusive-
supervision contract becomes more attractive than the collusion-proof contract. In contrast, with
a larger α, a smaller bribe is required to manipulate the signal. In collusive supervision, as the
agents pay a smaller cost for shirking, the principal must pay more to incentivize the agents.
Figure 1 illustrates Propositions 6 and 7 under different combinations of the parameters λ and
α. The Figure is generated by assuming that upwq “ ?wwith p1 “ 0.3 and 0.7. The no-supervision
contract is optimal in the left-hand area of the blue dashed line, whereas the collusion-proof con-
tract is optimal in the right-hand area of the red curve. The dominance of the collusive-supervision
contract occurs in the area between the blue dashed line and the red curve, representing λ and λ,
respectively. λ is decreasing in α, as shown in Proposition 7. In addition, the dominant regions
of the no-supervision contract and the collusive-supervision contract shrink as p1 increases. The
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reason is that when p1 increases, shirking (and colluding with the supervisor) is more attractive to
the agents, and in this case, the principal is better off adopting the collusion-proof contract.
Figure 1: Illustration of the Optimal Contract Choice
6 Discussion
6.1 Production uncertainty in the multiple-agent setting
In the analysis above, we assume that pp1, 1q “ 1 to focus on the uncertainty entailed by the su-
pervisory technology, which sets aside the uncertainty from production technology. As discussed
in the literature review, most of previous studies on the three-level hierarchy with a single agent
involve production uncertainty. Therefore, we examine the role of production uncertainty in the
current setting with multiple agents.
When 0 ă pp1, 1q ă 1, there exists a possibility that both agents have exerted efforts but the
production yields a lower output. Propositions 8 and 9 in Appendix B show that it is still beneficial
to allow supervisor-agent collusion when the supervisory efficiency is at an intermediate level. In
other words, the main results in Propositions 5 and 6 concerning optimal contract design in a
multiple-agent hierarchy are robust to the setting of production uncertainty.
Next, let us consider an extreme case in which λ “ 1 and 0 ă pp1, 1q ă 1, i.e., the supervi-
sor always collects the correct signal. In this case, the problem of inefficient supervision disap-
pears but uncertainty in production remains. The comparison among Zno, Zcp, and Zcs shows
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that the collusion-proof contract strictly dominates the no-supervision contract and the collusive-
supervision contract. Thus, it is optimal to prevent supervisor-agent collusion regardless of the
level of production uncertainty. Therefore, this case clearly demonstrates that the failure of the
collusion-proof principle in Tirole (1986) is rooted in inefficient supervision. The trade-off between
inefficient supervision and collusion identified in this paper is novel.
6.2 Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a single-agent hierarchy
We have shown that a new trade-off between supervisory efficiency and collusion exists in the
multiple-agent environment and that the principal would be better off allowing collusion. How-
ever, why does such a trade-off not exist in the single-agent setting? In this subsection, we examine
the setting with one agent and show that the collusive-supervision contract is equivalent to the
no-supervision contract.
Wemodify themodel in the followingway. There is one productive agent in the hierarchy. If the
agent works, the probability of producing outputH is one; in other words, there is no uncertainty
regarding the production technologywhen the agent chooses towork. However, if the agent shirks,
the probability of y “ H is p P p0, 1q. As there is only one agent, the signal set is t0, 1u. We further
assume that if the supervisor is inefficient (with probability 1´ λ); she observes a signal of either
0 or 1 with equal probability, i.e., 1{2. Let wyp1|0q denote the payoff of the agent when the signal
is 0 but the supervisor and the agent collude to report 1. The IC constraint is as follows:
λupwHp1qq ` p1´ λq
”1
2
upwHp1qq ` 1
2
upwHp1|0qq
ı
´ ϕ
ě p
#
λupwHp1qq ` p1´ λq
”1
2
upwHp1qq ` 1
2
upwHp1|0qq
ı+
` p1´ pq
#
λupwLp1qq ` p1´ λq“1
2
upwLp1qq ` 1
2
upwLp1|0qq
ı+
,
(ICs)
which can be rewritten as#
λupwHp1qq ` p1´ λq
”1
2
upwHp1qq ` 1
2
upwHp1|0qq
ı+
´
#
λupwLp1qq ` p1´ λq
”1
2
upwLp1qq ` 1
2
upwLp1|0qq
ı+
ě ϕp1´ pq .
Clearly, to provide incentives for the agent to work, it is optimal for the principal not to reward
the agent when y “ L. Furthermore, the principal should pay wHp1|0q “ wHp1q (and 0 to the
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supervisor). The equation can then be simplified to p1 ´ pqupwHp1qq ě ϕ, which is the same as
(ICno); the collusive-supervision contract is equivalent to the no-supervision contract. In other
words, it is optimal for the principal to avoid both problems by not hiring a supervisor, and the
trade-off does not exist in a single-agent hierarchy.
6.3 Honest supervision
A seemingly ideal contracting environment is that the supervisor is honest and always truth-
fully reports the observed signal (r “ θ). In this case, the optimization problem with an honest
supervisor is the same as (Pcp) except that the (CICf ) and (CICs) constraints are removed. We
call this contract the collusion-free (cf) contract. The payment structure of the collusion-free contract
is as follows. The principal pays zero to both agents when y “ L. When y “ H , each agent ob-
tains w˜Hcf if the supervisory signal is positive, regardless of the signal about the other agent. By the
equilibrium IC constraint, w˜Hcf is given by
λupw˜Hcf q ` 12p1´ p1qp1´ λqupw˜
H
cf q “ ϕ,
which is the same as (ĂICcp), and thus, w˜Hcf “ w˜Hcp. The supervisor does not need to be incentivized
to tell the truth, so syprq “ 0 for all r. The total cost of the principal is C˜cf “ 2λw˜Hcf ` p1´ λqw˜Hcf “
p1`λqw˜Hcf , which is clearly smaller than C˜cp “ 2w˜Hcp. Therefore, the collusion-free contract (with an
honest supervisor) always dominates the collusion-proof contract (with a corruptible supervisor).
Nevertheless, the collusion-free contract may not always dominate the no-supervision contract
and the collusive-supervision contract. Example 1 demonstrates this possibility:
Example. Let upwq “ ?w, ϕ “ 1, p1 “ 1{2, λ “ 0.1, and α “ 1{2. From (xICno), wˆHno “ 4 and
Cˆno “ 8. From (ĂICcp), w˜Hcf “ w˜Hcp « 9.467, C˜cp « 18.935 and C˜cf « 10.414. From (|ICcs), we have
wˇHcs « 4.310 and Cˇcs « 8.620. Clearly, the collusion-free contract entails a higher cost than the
no-supervision and collusive-supervision contracts. However, letting upwq “ w and maintaining
the same parameter values, we have Cˆno “ 4, C˜cp « 6.154, Cˇcs « 4.267, and C˜cf « 3.385. In this
case, it is less costly to provide incentives to the agents using the collusion-free contract.
Therefore, surprisingly, having an honest but inaccurate supervisor may be more costly than
having a corruptible and equally inaccurate supervisor. The reason is that it is possible to correct
a wrong signal with a corruptible supervisor, but not with an honest one. Which scenario is better
for the principal depends on the parameter values and the form of the utility function. We leave
the general analysis of comparing honest and corruptible supervisors for future research.
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7 Conclusion
We study a principal-supervisor-two-agent hierarchy in which the supervisor may be ineffi-
cient. The supervisor and the agents can collude to forge a supervisory report. We first demon-
strate that, compared to the no-supervision contract, having the supervisor is still valuable for the
principal. More importantly, we provide novel insights into collusion under inefficient supervi-
sion: There is a trade-off between the risk from inefficient supervision and the loss from collusion.
When the supervisory efficiency is at an intermediate level, allowing a sub-coalition permits the
supervisor to revise incorrect supervisory signals and reduce the risk rooted in inefficient supervi-
sory technology. This key trade-off is essential for solving the optimal contract in a hierarchy with
multiple agents and soft supervisory information. In the collusive-supervision contract, an agent’s
reward scheme is determined by both individual and team performance measures. We provide a
full solution of the principal’s contract design problem under different levels of supervisory ef-
ficiency. We obtain the novel finding that the collusive-supervision contract is optimal when the
accuracy of the supervisory signal is at an intermediate level.
In most organizations including companies and institutions, the managerial hierarchy or sys-
tem generally involves several layers from the top and intermediate managers to multiple pro-
ductive units or agents. The agents’ effort levels are typically unobservable, and thus, subjective
and objective assessments are generally combined to evaluate their performances. Our analysis
above provides a fundamental setting to model such complicated managerial environments and
the related contract design problems. It sheds light on a novel impact jointly caused by supervi-
sory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy, which is not present in a single-agent
framework.
Our results offer several managerial implications. First, when designing contracts, managers
should consider the supervisors’ capabilities on performance or promotion assessments. For ex-
ample, as shown above, according to the level of supervisory inefficiency, the payment scheme in
the optimal contract choice may or may not depend on the supervisory reports of other agents
in the team. Second, our analysis not only answers the question of whether and when collusion
should be tolerated but also examines to what extent. This serves as a guidance to managers on
what types of collusion she should tolerate in practice. Finally, one should interpret our results
in a caution that although allowing collusion is beneficial in some certain circumstances, in the
long run it is more desirable to advance supervisory efficiency, i.e., rising accuracy and reliability
of supervisory technology, to incentivize agents and solve the common complaint from the agents
that “my supervisor does not evaluate my performance correctly.”
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. Rewrite (ICno) as p1´p1qupwHA q´p1´p1qupwLAq´ϕ ě 0. The Lagrangian
for (Pno) is
L “ 2wHA ´ δ
“p1´ p1qupwHA q ´ p1´ p1qupwLAq ´ ϕ‰,
with the additional non-negativity constraints. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for minimization are
(A1) : BLBwHA
“ 2´ δp1´ p1qu1pwHA q ě 0, wHA ě 0, and wHA BLBwHA
“ 0;
(A2) : BLBwLA
“ δp1´ p1qu1pwLAq ě 0, wLA ě 0, and wLA BLBwLA
“ 0;
plus the complementary slackness conditions for the constraints.
Step 1. It is impossible to have δ “ 0 because it implies that wHA “ 0 in (A1), which violates (ICno),
yielding a contradiction. We therefore have δ ą 0 and wHA ą 0, which further give BL{BwHA “ 0
and δ “ 2{rp1´ p1qu1pwHA qs.
Step 2. Given δ ą 0, (A2) indicates that BL{BwLA ą 0 and wLA “ 0, which indicates no reward in the
no-supervision contract when the output is low.
Step 3. Given wˆLA “ 0, when (ICno) is binding, denoted by (xICno), we have the value of wˆHno:
p1´ p1qupwˆHnoq “ ϕ ðñ wˆHno “ u´1p ϕ1´ p1 q.
The total payment of the principal is Cˆno “ 2wˆHno.
Proof of Lemma 1. For part (a), we have T yp1, 1q “ T yp1, 0q from (CICf ), that is,
wyAp1, 1q ` wyBp1, 1q ` syp1, 1q “ wyAp1, 0q ` wyBp1, 0q ` syp1, 0q.
Furthermore, (CICs) indicates that wyBp1, 1q ` syp1, 1q “ wyBp1, 0q ` syp1, 0q. Therefore, wyAp1, 0q “
wyAp1, 1q.
Similarly, (CICf ) requires T yp0, 1q “ T yp0, 0q, and therefore,
wyAp0, 1q ` wyBp0, 1q ` syp0, 1q “ wyAp0, 0q ` wyBp0, 0q ` syp0, 0q.
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Again, (CICs) indicates that wyBp0, 1q ` syp0, 1q “ wyBp0, 0q ` syp0, 0q. Hence, wyAp0, 0q “ wyAp0, 1q.
Part (b) holds because the two agents are symmetric.
Proof of Proposition 2. Given Lemma 1, rewrite (ICcp) as
λupwHA p1, 1qq ` p1´ λq
“1
2
upwHA p1, 1qq ` 12upw
H
A p0, 0qq
‰´ ϕ
ě p1
!
λupwHA p0, 0qq ` p1´ λq
“1
2
upwHA p1, 1qq ` 12upw
H
A p0, 0qq
‰)
` p1´ p1q
!
λupwLAp0, 0qq ` p1´ λq
“1
2
upwLAp1, 1qq ` 12upw
L
Ap0, 0qq
‰)
.
For the principal’s cost-minimization problem (Pcp), the Lagrangian is
L “ 2wHA p1, 1q ` sHp1, 1q
´ δ
!
λupwHA p1, 1qq ´ λp1upwHA p0, 0qq ` p1´ p1qp1´ λq
“1
2
upwHA p1, 1qq ` 12upw
H
A p0, 0qq
‰
´ λp1´ p1qupwLAp0, 0qq ´ p1´ p1qp1´ λq
“1
2
upwLAp1, 1qq ` 12upw
L
Ap0, 0qq
‰´ ϕ).
with the additional non-negativity constraints. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for minimization are
(B1) : BLBwHA p1, 1q
“ 2´ δ“λ` 1
2
p1´ λqp1´ p1q
‰
u1pwHA p1, 1qq ě 0,
wHA p1, 1q ě 0 and wHA p1, 1q BLBwHA p1, 1q
“ 0;
(B2) : BLBwLAp1, 1q
“ δ“1
2
p1´ λqp1´ p1q
‰
u1pwLAp1, 1qq ě 0,
wLAp1, 1q ě 0 and wLAp1, 1q BLBwLAp1, 1q
“ 0;
(B3) : BLBwHA p0, 0q
“ ´δ“1
2
p1´ λqp1´ p1q ´ λp1
‰
u1pwHA p0, 0qq ě 0,
wHA p0, 0q ě 0 and wHA p0, 0q BLBwHA p0, 0q
“ 0;
(B4) : BLBwLAp0, 0q
“ δ“λp1´ p1q ` 1
2
p1´ p1qp1´ λq
‰
u1pwLAp0, 0qq ě 0,
wLAp0, 0q ě 0 and wLAp0, 0q BLBwLAp0, 0q
“ 0;
(B5) : BLBsHp1, 1q “ 1 ě 0, s
Hp1, 1q ě 0 and sHp1, 1q BLBsHp1, 1q “ 0;
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plus the complementary slackness conditions for the constraints.
Step 1. It is impossible to have δ “ 0 because it implies that BL{BwHA p1, 1q “ 2 ą 0 and wHA p1, 1q “ 0
in (B1), which violates (ICno), yielding a contradiction. Therefore, we should have δ ą 0 and
wHA p1, 1q ą 0, implying that BL{BwHA p1, 1q “ 0 and δ “ 2{
“
λ` 12p1´ λqp1´ p1qqu1pwHA p1, 1q
‰
. Fur-
thermore, by Lemma 1, we have wLAp1, 1q “ wLAp1, 0q ą 0.
Step 2. Given δ ą 0, (B2) and (B4) show that BL{BwLAp1, 1q ą 0 and BL{BwLAp0, 0q ą 0, respectively,
given thatwLAp1, 1q “ wLAp0, 0q “ 0. By Lemma 1, we havewLAp1, 0q “ wLAp0, 1q “ 0. Furthermore, as
sLprq for all r do not appear in the Lagrangian, we are free to choose theminimumvalue (sLprq “ 0)
to satisfy the non-negativity constraints.
Step 3. From (B5), we clearly have sHp1, 1q “ 0.
Step 4. From (B3), there is a unique cutoff, denoted by λ˚, that satisfies the following equation:
1
2
p1´ λ˚qp1´ p1q ´ λ˚p1 “ 0.10
This equation gives the following two cases: λ ă λ˚ and λ ě λ˚.
(a) When λ ă λ˚, BL{BwHA p0, 0q must be zero, implying that wHA p0, 0q “ `8. Therefore, there
is no advantage for the principal in sending a supervisor, and he is better off implementing the
no-supervision contract.
(b) When λ ě λ˚, BL{BwHA p0, 0q is strictly positive, which implies that wHA p0, 0q “ 0. By Lemma 1,
we also have wHA p0, 1q “ 0. Furthermore, because (CICf ) and (CICs) should hold, we then have
sHp0, 0q “ 2wHA p1, 1q and sHp1, 0q “ sHp0, 1q “ wHA p1, 1q.
Finally, we denote wHA p1, 1q in equilibrium by w˜Hcp, which is uniquely determined by (ĂICcp):
λupw˜Hcpq ` p1´ p1qp1´ λq12upw˜Hcpq “ ϕ.
By the symmetry of the two agents, we can easily establish the payment structure for agent B,
with the principal incurring a total cost of C˜cp “ 2w˜Hcp.
10This condition can also be used to compare (xICno) and (ĂICcp).
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Proof of Proposition 7. Part (a): Differentiating λwith respect to α yields
Bλ
Bα “
p1´ p1qu1pαwˇHcsqwˇHcs
rp1´ p1qupwˇHcsq ` p1` 3p1qupαwˇHcsqs ´
p1´ p1qp1` 3p1qrupwˇHcsq ` upαwˇHcsqsu1pαwˇHcsqwˇHcs
rp1´ p1qupwˇHcsq ` p1` 3p1qupαwˇHcsqs2
“ ´4p1p1´ p1qupwˇ
H
csqu1pαwˇHcsqwˇHcs
rp1´ p1qupwˇHcsq ` p1` 3p1qupαwˇHcsqs2
ă 0.
λ is decreasing in α.
Part (b): Plugging α “ 0 into (12) gives λ “ 1. With α “ 0, (|ICcs) can be written as follows:
λupwˇHcsq ` p1´ λqp1´ p1q34upwˇ
H
csq “ ϕ.
Comparing this equation with (ĂICcp) immediately indicates that wˇHcs ď w˜Hcp for any λ P rλ˚, 1s.
Plugging α “ 1 into (12) gives λ “ λ˚. With α “ 1, (|ICcs) can be written as
λupwˇHcsq ` 12p1´ p1qp1´ λqupwˇ
H
csq `
“1
2
p1´ λqp1´ p1q ´ λp1
‰
upwˇHcsq “ ϕ.
Given that 12p1´λqp1´p1q´λp1 ă 0 for any λ P rλ˚, 1s, comparing the equation above with (ĂICcp)
immediately indicates that wˇHcs ě w˜Hcp.
Part (c): Let us define the terms associated with bargaining power α in (|ICcs) as the function
κ ” p14p1 ´ λqp1 ´ p1q ´ λp1qupαwˇHcsq. Clearly, if λ ą λ, then κ ă 0, and therefore, an increase
in bargaining power α leads to a higher wˇHcs to satisfy (|ICcs).
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Appendix B
(For Online Publication)
In this appendix, we examine the case in which 0 ă pp1, 1q ă 1 and show that the main result
of the paper is robust. Denote p2 ” pp1, 1q and assume that 0 ă p1 ă p2 ă 1, which means that
having more agents working on production generates a higher probability of obtaining outputH .
Inwhat follows, we provide the IR and IC constraints for the no-supervision contract, the collusion-
proof contract, and the collusive-supervision contract. For the no-supervision contract, (IRno) and
(ICno) are replaced by the following two constraints, respectively:
(IR1no) p2upwHA q ` p1´ p2qupwLAq ´ ϕ ě 0.
(IC 1no) p2upwHA q ` p1´ p2qupwLAq ´ ϕ ě p1upwHA q ` p1´ p1qupwLAq.
For collusion-proof contract, (IRcp) and (ICcp) can be rewritten, respectively, as
p2
#
λupwHA p1, 1qq ` p1´ λq
”1
2
upwHA p1, 1qq ` 12upw
H
A p0, 0qq
ı+
` p1´ p2q
#
λupwLAp1, 1qq ` p1´ λq
”1
2
upwLAp1, 1qq ` 12upw
L
Ap0, 0qq
ı+
´ ϕ ě 0.
(IR1cp)
p2
#
λupwHA p1, 1qq ` p1´ λq
”1
2
upwHA p1, 1qq ` 12upw
H
A p0, 0qq
ı+
` p1´ p2q
#
λupwLAp1, 1qq ` p1´ λq
”1
2
upwLAp1, 1qq ` 12upw
L
Ap0, 0qq
ı+
´ ϕ
ě p1
#
λupwHA p0, 0qq ` p1´ λq
”1
2
upwHA p1, 1qq ` 12upw
H
A p0, 0qq
ı+
` p1´ p1q
!
λupwLAp0, 0qq ` p1´ λq
”1
2
upwLAp1, 1qq ` 12upw
L
Ap0, 0qq
ı+
.
(IC 1cp)
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For collusive supervision, (IRcs) and (ICcs) can be rewritten, respectively, as
p2
#
λupwHA p1, 1qq ` p1´ λq
”1
2
upwHA p1, 1q ` 14upw
H
A p11|01qq ` 14upw
H
A p11|00qq
ı+
` p1´ p2q
#
λupwLAp1, 1qq ` p1´ λq
”1
2
upwLAp1, 1qq ` 14upw
L
Ap11|01qq ` 14upw
L
Ap11|00qq
ı+
´ ϕ ě 0.
(IR1cs)
p2
#
λupwHA p1, 1qq ` p1´ λq
”1
2
upwHA p1, 1q ` 14upw
H
A p11|01qq ` 14upw
H
A p11|00qq
ı+
` p1´ p2q
#
λupwLAp1, 1qq ` p1´ λq
”1
2
upwLAp1, 1qq ` 14upw
L
Ap11|01qq ` 14upw
L
Ap11|00qqq
ı+
´ ϕ
ě p1
#
λupwHA p11|01q ` p1´ λq
”1
2
upwHA p1, 1qq ` 14upw
H
A p11|01qq ` 14upw
H
A p11|00qq
ı+
` p1´ p1q
#
λupwLAp11|01qq ` p1´ λq
”1
2
upwLAp1, 1qq ` 14upw
L
Ap11|01qq ` 14upw
L
Ap11|00qq
ı+
.
(IC 1cs)
Let us consider the case when y “ L and examine whether collusion would help the principal
achieve a lower expected cost. We reach the following result.
Proposition 8. Given p2 P p0, 1q, with y “ L, allowing collusion cannot improve the expected cost of the
principal.
Proof. Let us focus on the terms of the IC constraints associated with low output in the collusion-
proof contract and in the collusive-supervision contract and compare them to determine which
one induces lower payments to the agents.
We first examine the terms associated with low output in (IC 1cp). Define
X “ λp1´ p2qupwLAp1, 1qq ´ λp1´ p1qupwLAp0, 0qq ´ pp2 ´ p1qp1´ λq
ˆ
1
2
upwLAp1, 1qq ` 12upw
L
Ap0, 0qq
˙
.
Since wLAp0, 0q “ wLAp0, 1q in the collusion-proof contract, we can then rewrite X as
X “ λp1´ p2qupwLAp1, 1qq ´ λp1´ p1qupwLAp0, 1qq
´ pp2 ´ p1qp1´ λq
ˆ
1
2
upwLAp1, 1qq ` 14upw
L
Ap0, 1qq ` 14upw
L
Ap0, 0qq
˙
.
Furthermore, because upwLAp0, 1qq ď upwLAp11|01qq and upwLAp0, 0qq ď upwLAp11|00qq in the side
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contract between the supervisor and the agents, we have the following inequality:
X ě λp1´ p2qupwLAp1, 1qq ´ λp1´ p1qupwLAp11|01qq
´ pp2 ´ p1qp1´ λq
ˆ
1
2
upwLAp1, 1qq ` 14upw
L
Ap11|01qq ` 14upw
L
Ap11|00q
˙
.
The right-hand side of the inequality above are the terms associated with low output in (IC 1cs),
which indicates that the collusion-proof contract induces lower expected payments to the principal
when y “ L.
Next, we study the case of y “ H . The result is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Given p2 P p0, 1q, define λ˚ ” p2´p1p2`p1 . With y “ H , there exist unique cutoffs λ P p0, λ˚q
and λ P pλ˚, 1q such that
(i) if λ ă λ, the no-supervision contract is optimal;
(ii) if λ ď λ ď λ, it is beneficial for the principal to allow collusion; and
(iii) if λ ą λ, the collusion-proof contract is optimal.11
Proof. Let us focus on the terms associated with high output in (IC 1no), (IC 1cp), and (IC 1cs). We
compare them to determine which one induces lower payments to the agents.
Wefirst consider the comparison between the no-supervision contract and the collusive-supervision
contract when λ P r0, λ˚s. Let us examine the terms associated with high output in (IC 1cs), which
is denoted by F :
F pλq “ λp2upwHA p1, 1qq ´ λp1upwHA p11|01qq
` pp2 ´ p1qp1´ λq
ˆ
1
2
upwHA p1, 1qq ` 14upw
H
A p11|01qq ` 14upw
H
A p11|00qq
˙
“ λp2upwHA p1, 1qq ´ λp1upwHA p11|01qq ` pp2 ´ p1qp1´ λq
ˆ
upwHA p1, 1qq
´ 1
2
upwHA p1, 1qq ` 14upw
H
A p11|01qq ` 14upw
H
A p11|00qq
˙
ą pp2 ´ p1qupwHA p1, 1qq ` pp2 ´ p1qp1´ λq
ˆ
1
4
upwHA p11|01qq ` 14upw
H
A p11|00qq
˙
´ λp1upwHA p11|01qq.
(13)
11Note that the values of λ and λ depend on the specific utility function form of the agents and the bargaining process
between the supervisor and the agents.
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Given that wyAp11|00q ě wyAp11|01q and up.q is increasing and concave, if λ “ λ˚, it is easy to check
that the following inequality should be true:
pp2 ´ p1qp1´ λ˚q
ˆ
1
4
upwHA p11|01qq ` 14upw
H
A p11|00qq
˙
´ λ˚p1upwHA p11|01qq ą 0.
This implies that
F pλ “ λ˚q ą pp2 ´ p1qupwHA p1, 1qq.
The right-hand side of the inequality above is the term associated with high output in the IC con-
straint (equation (IC 1no)) of the no-supervision contract, indicating that the payment to the agents
in the no-supervision contract is greater than the payment in the collusive contract, wˆH ą wHA p1, 1q,
when λ “ λ˚.
We then consider the case of λ “ 0. Since wHA p1, 1q ą wHA p11|01q and wHA p1, 1q ą wHA p11|00q,
F pλ “ 0q “ pp2 ´ p1q
ˆ
1
2
upwHA p1, 1qq ` 14upw
H
A p11|01qq ` 14upw
H
A p11|00qq
˙
ă pp2 ´ p1qupwHA p1, 1qq.
The right-hand side of the inequality above is (IC 1no), which indicates that the payment to the
agents in the no-supervision contract is less than the payment in the collusive-supervision contract.
Hence, when λ “ 0, wˆH ă wHA p1, 1q. Furthermore, it is easy to show that the derivative of F with
respect to λ is positive:
BF pλq
Bλ “ p2upw
H
A p1, 1qq ´ p1upwHA p11|01qq
´ pp2 ´ p1q
ˆ
1
2
upwHA p1, 1qq ` 14upw
H
A p11|01qq ` 14upw
H
A p11|00qq
˙
ą pp2 ´ p1qupwHA p1, 1qq
´ pp2 ´ p1q
ˆ
1
2
upwHA p1, 1qq ` 14upw
H
A p11|01qq ` 14upw
H
A p11|00qq
˙
ą 0
Thus, by the continuity of F pλq, there must exist a unique cutoff λ P p0, λ˚q such that if λ “ λ,
wHA p1, 1q “ wˆH .
Next, we compare the collusion-proof contract and the collusive-supervision contract when
λ P rλ˚, 1s. Let us examine the terms associated with high output in(IC 1cp), which is denoted by T :
T pλq “ λp2upwHA p1, 1qq ` pp2 ´ p1qp1´ λq12upw
H
A p1, 1qq.
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Since wHA p0, 1q “ wHA p0, 0q “ 0 in the collusion-proof contract, if λ “ λ˚, the following equality
should be true.
pp2 ´ p1qp1´ λ˚q
ˆ
1
4
upwHA p0, 1qq ` 14upw
H
A p0, 0qq
˙
´ λ˚p1upwHA p0, 1qq “ 0.
This implies
T pλ “ λ˚q “ λ˚p2upwHA p1, 1qq ` pp2 ´ p1qp1´ λ˚q12upw
H
A p1, 1qq
` pp2 ´ p1qp1´ λ˚q
ˆ
1
4
upwHA p0, 1qq ` 14upw
H
A p0, 0qq
˙
´ λ˚p1upwHA p0, 1qq
ă λ˚p2upwHA p1, 1qq ´ λ˚p1upwHA p11|01qq
` pp2 ´ p1qp1´ λ˚q
ˆ
1
2
upwHA p1, 1qq ` 14upw
H
A p11|01qq ` 14upw
H
A p11|00qq
˙
“ F pλ “ λ˚q.
This indicates that the payment to the agents in the collusive-supervision contract is less than the
payment in the collusion-proof contract, wHA p1, 1q ă w˜H , when λ “ λ˚.
When λ “ 1, F pλ “ 1q can be written as follows:
F pλ “ 1q “ p2upwHA p1, 1qq ´ p1upwHA p11|01qq ă p2upwHA p1, 1qq ´ p1upwHA p0, 1qq “ T pλ “ 1q.
The right-hand side of the inequality above are the terms associated with high output in (IC 1cp).
Thus, the payment to the agents in the collusive-supervision contract is greater than the payment
in the collusion-proof contract, wHA p1, 1q ą w˜H , when λ “ 1. We further check the derivative of T
with respect to λ, that is,
BT pλq
Bλ “ pp2 ` p1qp1´ λq
1
2
upwHA p1, 1qq ą 0.
Since the derivative of F with respect to λ is also positive, the functions T and F will only cross
once. Denote the intersection between the two functions by λ P pλ˚, 1q and we then have w˜H “
wHA p1, 1qwhen λ “ λ.
Summarizing the analysis above, we conclude that ifλ ă λ, it is optimal to use the no-supervision
contract; however, if λ ď λ ď λ, allowing collusion helps the principal lower the expected total pay-
ment; if λ ă λ, the collusion-proof implementation becomes optimal.
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